Published July 13, 2017
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ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism
Abstract
In 1990 the South Coast Air Quality Management District created a tradable emissions program to more efficiently manage the ex- tremely bad emissions in the Los Angeles basin. The program created 136 different assets that an environmental engineer could use to cover emissions in place of installing expensive abatement equipment. Standard markets could not deal with this complexity and little trading occurred. A new combinatorial market was created in response and operated successfully for many years. That market design, called ACE (approximate competitive equilibrium), is described in detail and its successful performance in practice is analyzed.
Additional Information
To appear in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Cambridge University Press. John Ledyard would like to thank NSF for its support under grants numbered 1216024-ICES: Large: Collaborative Research: Markets - Algorithms, Applications and the Digital Economy and 1518941-NeTS: Large: Networked Markets: Theory and Applications.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1424.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 78852
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443
- CCF-1216024
- NSF
- CNS-1518941
- NSF
- Created
-
2017-07-13Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1424