Published May 2004
| Published
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Experimental Study of Market Reputation Mechanisms
- Creators
- Chen, Kay-Yut
- Hogg, Tad
- Wozny, Nathan
Chicago
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Abstract
We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.
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- 69801
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160819-161905457
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2016-08-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field