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Published 1989 | public
Book Section - Chapter

Electoral accountability and incumbency

Abstract

This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.

Additional Information

© 1989 Regents of the University of Michigan.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 18, 2023