Published May 1990
| public
Journal Article
Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Creators
- Banks, Jeffrey S.
Abstract
This paper extends the Romer-Rosenthal [1978, 1979] model of monopoly agenda control to an environment where only the agenda setter knows with certainty the outcome associated with a failed proposal. The presence of this asymmetric information implies that any "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal may provide information crucial to the decision calculus of the voters, a fact which an optimal proposal strategy will incorporate. The equilibrium behavior of the agenda setter and voters is characterized and contrasted with that in the complete information environment, and a number of empirical predictions concerning the nature of elections with monopoly controlled agendas are derived.
Additional Information
© 1990 Oxford University Press. would like to thank Keith Krehbiel, Howard Rosenthal, and seminar participants at the Hoover Institution and Washington University for helpful discussions, and four referees and an editor for constructive criticisms and suggestions. Financial support of the National Science Foundation through grant SES-8700468 is gratefully acknowledged.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 67328
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-074526852
- SES-8700468
- NSF
- Created
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2016-05-26Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field