Monotonicity in Electoral Systems
- Creators
- Austen-Smith, David
- Banks, Jeffrey
Abstract
Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system-voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy-we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.
Additional Information
© 1991 American Political Science Association.Attached Files
Published - 1963173.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 67314
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-145834215
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2016-05-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field