Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published March 31, 2016 | Submitted
Report Open

Horizontal Mergers of Online Firms: Structural Estimation and Competitive Effects

Abstract

This paper (1) presents a general model of online price competition, (2) shows how to structurally estimate the underlying parameters of the model when the number of competing firms is unknown or in dispute, (3) estimates these parameters based on UK data for personal digital assistants, and (4) uses these estimates to simulate the competitive effects of horizontal mergers. Our results suggest that competitive effects in this online market are more closely aligned with the simple homogeneous product Bertrand model than might be expected given the observed price dispersion and number of firms. Our estimates indicate that so long as two firms remain in the market post merger, the average transaction price is roughly unaffected by horizontal mergers. However, there are potential distributional effects; our estimates indicate that a three-to-two merger raises the average transaction price paid by price sensitive "shoppers" by 2.88 percent, while lowering the average transaction price paid by consumers "loyal" to a particular firm by 1.37 percent.

Additional Information

This research began while Baye was serving as the Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. We thank his former colleagues there, especially Dan OĆ­Brien and Dan Hosken, for helpful discussions. We also thank seminar participants at Northwestern University for comments on a preliminary draft. Morgan thanks the National Science Foundation for financial support.

Attached Files

Submitted - Horizontal_Mergers_Online.pdf

Files

Horizontal_Mergers_Online.pdf
Files (275.2 kB)
Name Size Download all
md5:a4950783dbfc78bdbc42469bf157e5f4
275.2 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
January 13, 2024