Published November 2002
| public
Journal Article
Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters
- Creators
- Crémer, Jacques
-
Palfrey, Thomas R.
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of local monopoly agenda setting on federal standards. Federal standards specify a minimum (or maximum) point in policy space which can be raised (or lowered) by local option. Without local agenda setters, this creates incentives for nonmajoritarian outcomes, with a tendency for policies to be too high (low). Local agenda setters may have incentives to distort these outcomes even further. We demonstrate that federal standards can counterbalance the distortions of local agenda setters.
Additional Information
© 2002 Springer. We wish to thank LEESP, CNRS, and NSF for financial support. The paper has benefitted from helpful comments by Andy Postlewaite, Howard Rosenthal, Norman Schofield, and an anonymous referee.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65192
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-103936514
- Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
- NSF
- Created
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2016-03-17Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field