Published October 1991
| public
Journal Article
Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-play Communication
- Creators
- Srivastava, Sanjay
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Palfrey, Thomas R.
Chicago
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of designing efficient trading mechanisms that are immune to pre-play communication. It is well known that equilibrium behavior can be affected, sometimes drastically, if players have the opportunity to exchange messages prior to playing some particular game. We investigate the relationship between efficiency, pre-play communication, and unique implementation in Bayesian environments with independent types and private values. We identify a class of simple mechanisms which are immune to pre-play communication and show that any incentive efficient allocation can be uniquely implemented by such a mechanism.
Additional Information
© 1991 Elsevier. Received February 13, 1990; revised November 21, 1990. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation. We thank, without implicating, Andrew Postlewaite, Mark Satterthwaite, seminar participants at The University of Aix-Marseille, Barcelona, Caltech, CORE, Ecole Polytechnique, The University of Toulouse, The University of Western Ontario, participants of the 1989 NBER Conference on Decentralization, and the referees, for helpful comments. Published paper for internal review only. Formerly SSWP 693.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65135
- DOI
- 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-B
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-140227182
- NSF
- Created
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2016-04-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 693