Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis
- Creators
-
Palfrey, Thomas R.
- Rosenthal, Howard
Abstract
This paper considers the Nash equilibria to a game where a discrete public good is to be provided. Each individual may participate by making a fixed contribution. If a sufficient number of contributions are made, the good is provided. Otherwise, the good is not provided. One variant of the rules allows for contributions to be refunded when the good is not provided. For pure strategies, we find that the Nash equilibria with a refund are a superset of those without a refund. For both rules, the efficient number of players contributing is an equilibrium. For mixed strategies, to every equilibrium without a refund there is a corresponding equilibrium with a refund with a higher number of expected contributors. Mixed strategy equilibria 'disappear' as the number of players grows large. Some results reported in the experimental literature are discussed in light of these theoretical results.
Additional Information
Copyright © 1984 Published by Elsevier B.V. Received January 1983, revised version received January 1984. We thank Randy Simmons for sharing his data. We have benefited from discussions with Edward Green, David Hildebrand, Richard McKelvey, and John Orbell, and from the comments of a referee. This work was supported by NSF Grant SES79-17576. The paper was written while Howard Rosenthal was a Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at Caltech.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65022
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114154701
- NSF
- SES-7917576
- Created
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2016-03-28Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 465