Published March 1985
| public
Journal Article
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
- Creators
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Palfrey, Thomas R.
- Rosenthal, Howard
Abstract
The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.
Additional Information
© 1985 American Political Science Association. Received December 8, 1983. Revised May 11, 1984. Accepted July 3, 1984. Our debt to Ledyard's work should be obvious. We wish to thank Ed Green and Morgan Kousser for helpful discussions, and an anonymous referee for useful comments. This work was initiated while Rosenthal was a Sharman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65017
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-112114151
- Sherman Fairchild Foundation
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2016-03-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field