Published January 1983
| public
Journal Article
A Strategic Calculus of Voting
- Creators
-
Palfrey, Thomas R.
- Rosenthal, Howard
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
Presents a game-theoretic model of voter turnout, which features voting over two fixed alternatives as in a two-candidate election or in a referendum or initiative. Behavior of voters; Assumptions on the cost of voting against its potential benefits; Investigation on voting probabilities and the turnout decisions; Analysis of voting as a participation game.
Additional Information
© 1983 Mortinus Nijholf Publishers. Copyright of Public Choice is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V.. We have benented from discussion with Peter Coughlin, Terry Levesque, Peter Ordechook, Steve Salop, and participants in the Conference. This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant DAR-7917576. We thank Glenn Benson for preparing the computer graphics and Kathy Bagwell for processing the manuscript.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65012
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110552693
- NSF
- DAR-7917576
- Created
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2016-03-10Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2023-06-01Created from EPrint's last_modified field