Published June 1986
| public
Journal Article
Private Information in Large Economies
- Creators
-
Palfrey, Thomas R.
- Srivastava, Sanjey
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of private information in large economies. We show that in a model with stochastic information structures, the restrictions imposed on allocations by the presence of private information disappear in large economies. We also show that for a large class of direct mechanisms, the incentive for any agent to falsely report private information goes to zero as the number of agents becomes large. These results provide an "informational smallness" analog to existing "quantity smallness" limiting results in the literature.
Additional Information
© 1986 Elsevier. Received September 8, 1984; revised January 5, 1986. This paper has benefitted from comments by participants of seminars presented at the California Institute of Technology, Carnegie-Mellon University, and the Northwestern University 1984 Summer Workshop on Strategic Behavior and Competition. We especially wish to acknowledge useful discussions with Richard Green, John Ledyard, and Andrew Postlewaite. All errors remain ours.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65011
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110214889
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2016-03-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-22Created from EPrint's last_modified field