Published June 2009
| public
Journal Article
Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
- Creators
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Palfrey, Thomas R.
Chicago
Abstract
This article summarizes a small part of the literature on laboratory experiments in political economy. The experiments discussed are primarily aimed at testing predictions of equilibrium models of voting in committees and elections. The specific topics discussed are voter turnout, the Condorcet jury theorem, and the swing voter's curse. The latter two topics address questions of information aggregation by voting rules. All the experiments find significant evidence of strategic voting and, with a few exceptions, find support for the equilibrium predictions of the theories.
Additional Information
© 2012 Annual Reviews. The support of the National Science Foundation and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 64924
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-140245830
- NSF
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- Created
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2016-03-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field