Published November 2015
| Published + Supplemental Material
Journal Article
Open
Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency
- Creators
-
Jackson, Matthew O.
- Yariv, Leeat
Abstract
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.
Additional Information
© 2015 American Economic Association. We thank Nageeb Ali, Sandro Ambuehl, James Andreoni, Kenneth Arrow, Mariagiovanna Baccara, Miguel Angel Ballester, Douglas Bernheim, Martin Browning, Christopher Chambers, Jeff Ely, Keith Ericson, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry Green, Olivier l'Haridon, Andrew Hertzberg, Julian Jamison, Lauren Merrill, Jochen Mierau, Massimo Morelli, Efe Ok, Antonio Rangel, Ariel Rubinstein, Erik Snowberg, and Tomasz Strzalecki for useful discussions and suggestions, as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014 and SES 0961481) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Grant 1158).Attached Files
Published - mic.20140161.pdf
Supplemental Material - 2014-0161_app.pdf
Supplemental Material - 2014-0161_ds.zip
Files
2014-0161_ds.zip
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 62457
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20151130-135309088
- SES 0551014
- NSF
- SES 0961481
- NSF
- 1158
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- Created
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2015-12-03Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field