Cyber-Shilling in Automobile Auctions: Evidence from a Field Experiment
- Creators
- Grether, David
- Porter, David
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Shum, Matthew
Abstract
We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the "price grid," or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers suggesting that they are "cyber-shills" working on behalf of sellers. These patterns do not appear in the New York auctions.
Additional Information
© 2015 American Economic Association. We thank the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation for grant GBMF#1158, which facilitated this research. We also thank Amit Gandhi, Yaron Raviv, Jimmy Roberts, Tom Ruchti, Artie Zillante, and seminar participants at Florida State University and Chapman University.Attached Files
Published - mic.20120085.pdf
Supplemental Material - 2012-0085_app.pdf
Supplemental Material - 2012-0085_data.zip
Supplemental Material - 2012-0085_ds.zip
Files
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 59826
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20150821-164309251
- 1158
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- Created
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2015-08-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field