Published May 2014
| Published
Journal Article
Open
The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture
Chicago
Abstract
The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be combined with new bids to form winning collections. Increment requirements dictate improvements over appropriate collections of existing bids. The auction evolved from experimental methods and operates at high levels of efficiency. Field applications are reported and result in natural equilibration in a few hours as opposed to days or weeks required by round-based architectures.
Additional Information
© 2014 American Economic Association. We thank Eiichiro Kazumori, Nicola Lansdell, Bill Stevenson, and Arch Roberts, Jr.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 44639
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140403-110525103
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2014-04-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field