Published April 1981
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study
- Creators
-
Plott, Charles R.
- Uhl, Jonathan T.
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
Public distrust of middlemen frequently occurs in market systems. Boycotts, regulations, and investigations of middlemen are not uncommon [3; 7]. This position of disfavor is somewhat paradoxical since application of economic theory suggests that competition among middlemen can be relied upon to protect consumers and producers. According to received doctrine any differences in purchase and resale prices would reflect the costs involved in market making. Nevertheless public suspicion remains.
Additional Information
© 1981 Southern Economic Association. Financial support provided by the National Science Foundation and by the Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged.Attached Files
Published - competitive_equilibrium_with_middlemen.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 43900
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-111245997
- NSF
- Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy
- Created
-
2014-02-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 313