Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published April 1981 | Published
Journal Article Open

Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study

Abstract

Public distrust of middlemen frequently occurs in market systems. Boycotts, regulations, and investigations of middlemen are not uncommon [3; 7]. This position of disfavor is somewhat paradoxical since application of economic theory suggests that competition among middlemen can be relied upon to protect consumers and producers. According to received doctrine any differences in purchase and resale prices would reflect the costs involved in market making. Nevertheless public suspicion remains.

Additional Information

© 1981 Southern Economic Association. Financial support provided by the National Science Foundation and by the Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged.

Attached Files

Published - competitive_equilibrium_with_middlemen.pdf

Files

competitive_equilibrium_with_middlemen.pdf
Files (604.2 kB)
Name Size Download all
md5:666bee78906cb6c81d8cf6957f9740f9
604.2 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
March 5, 2024