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Published August 2009 | public
Journal Article

Sequencing strategies in large, competitive, ascending price automobile auctions: An experimental examination

Abstract

This paper reports on a large-scale field experiment testing strategies available to a seller participating in simultaneous competitive sequential ascending price automobile auctions. Every other week, the seller offered approximately 100 vehicles for sale in an auction environment in which several competing sellers offered on the order of 3000 vehicles. The experiment tested various sequences in which the seller could offer the vehicles, such as high values first or low values first. Surprisingly, and contrary to intuition drawn from the theory of single item and single seller auctions, the worst performing sequence from those tested is for the seller to order vehicles from highest to lowest values. The best sequence is to group the vehicles by type and offer the low valued vehicles first and then move to offer the higher valued vehicles.

Additional Information

© 2009 Elsevier B.V. Received 10 November 2007; Received in revised form 20 February 2009; Accepted 25 February 2009; Available online 20 March 2009.

Additional details

Created:
August 20, 2023
Modified:
March 5, 2024