Published December 2014
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing
- Creators
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Cason, Timothy N.
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Plott, Charles R.
Abstract
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.
Additional Information
© 2014 by The University of Chicago. For helpful comments we thank three anonymous referees, Peter Bossaerts, Gary Charness, James Cox, Vincent Crawford, Dirk Engelmann, David Grether, Ori Heffetz, David Levine, Vai-Lam Mui, Rosemarie Nagel, Anmol Ratan, Aldo Rustichini, Matthew Shum, Charles Sprenger, Kathryn Zeiler, and presentation audiences at the University of California, Santa Barbara, University of Southern California, Purdue, Stanford, Monash, and Economic Science Association and Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory conferences. We retain responsibility for our interpretation and for any mistakes or misconceptions. Data are provided as supplementary material online.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 42932
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20131210-141208524
- Created
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2014-03-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2023-06-01Created from EPrint's last_modified field