Distributed Welfare Games
- Creators
- Marden, Jason R.
- Wierman, Adam
Abstract
Game-theoretic tools are becoming a popular design choice for distributed resource allocation algorithms. A central component of this design choice is the assignment of utility functions to the individual agents. The goal is to assign each agent an admissible utility function such that the resulting game possesses a host of desirable properties, including scalability, tractability, and existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria. In this paper we formally study this question of utility design on a class of games termed distributed welfare games. We identify several utility design methodologies that guarantee desirable game properties irrespective of the specific application domain. Lastly, we illustrate the results in this paper on two commonly studied classes of resource allocation problems: "coverage" problems and "coloring" problems.
Additional Information
© 2013 INFORMS. Received July 2010; revisions received August 2011, August 2012; accepted September 2012. Published online in Articles in Advance February 8, 2013. The authors thank the reviewers and editors of the paper for their valuable feedback, which improved the paper significantly. This work was supported by Air Force Office of Scientific Research [Grant FA9550-12-1-0359], Office of Naval Research [Grant N00014-12-1-0643], and the National Science Foundation [Grant CNS 0846025].Attached Files
Published - 155.full.pdf
Files
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:7fd19f27742f936c61de2d3b7cac063d
|
301.8 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 37881
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20130411-094140621
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
- FA9550-12-1-0359
- Office of Naval Research (ONR)
- N00014-12-1-0643
- NSF
- CNS 0846025
- Created
-
2013-04-17Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field