Published October 1, 2012
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Cartel and Oligopoly Pricing of Nonreplenishable Natural Resources
- Creators
- Lewis, Tracy R.
- Schmalensee, Richard
Abstract
This essay is concerned with the implications of these structures in markets for nonrenewable natural resources. Following Hotelling (1931) and numerous subsequent authors, we assume that the total reserves of the resource in the hands of each producer cannot be increased and are reduced by production. Demand and cost conditions, including the relevant rate of interest, are constant over time. In such a world, producers must rationally consider price or output paths over time, so that both models outlined above become non-zero sum differential games. In what follows, we examine solutions to the games implied by various assumptions.
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Submitted - 78-7_Tracy_R.Lewis_Cartel__oligopoly_pricing.pdf
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78-7_Tracy_R.Lewis_Cartel__oligopoly_pricing.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 34593
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20121001-114257937
- Created
-
2012-10-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Environmental Quality Laboratory
- Series Name
- Environmental Quality Laboratory Open File Report
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 78-7