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Published December 2011 | public
Journal Article

D. H. Mellor: The Matter of Chance

Glynn, Luke

Abstract

Though forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical acumen of its author that The Matter of Chance contains much that is of continued interest to the philosopher of science. Mellor advances a sophisticated propensity theory of chance, arguing that this theory makes better sense than its rivals (in particular subjectivist, frequentist, logical and classical theories) of 'what professional usage shows to be thought true of chance' (p. xi)—in particular, 'that chance is objective, empirical and not relational, and that it applies to the single case' (ibid.). The book is short and dense, with the serious philosophical content delivered thick and fast. There is little by way of road-mapping or summarizing to assist the reader: the introduction is hardly expansive and the concluding paragraph positively perfunctory. The result is that the book is often difficult going, and the reader is made to work hard to ensure correct understanding of the views expressed. On the other hand, the author's avoidance of unnecessary use of formalism and jargon ensures that the book is still reasonably accessible. In the following, I shall first summarize the key features of Mellor's propensity theory, and then offer a few critical remarks.

Additional Information

© 2011 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. Advance Access published on July 26, 2011. Funding: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SP279/15-1).

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 24, 2023