Published 2006
| public
Book Section - Chapter
A pricing mechanism which implements in Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in networks
- Creators
- Stoenescu, Tudor M.
- Ledyard, John O.
Chicago
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Abstract
We present a pricing mechanism which implements in Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning. This mechanism is different from the ones which appear in the existing literature since it accounts for the strategic behavior of individual users and achieves efficient allocations. We provide some insight on how one may generalize our mechanism, and we determine a particular network structure under which this mechanism is informationally efficient.
Additional Information
© 2006 IEEE. Issue Date: 13-15 Dec. 2006. Date of Current Version: 07 May 2007.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 24554
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110726-142105653
- Created
-
2011-07-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
- Other Numbering System Name
- INSPEC Accession Number
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 9430711