Behavioral Economics and Nonrational Organizational Decision Making
- Creators
-
Camerer, Colin F.
- Others:
- Halpern, Jennifer J.
- Stern, Robert N.
Abstract
My chapter focuses on behavioral economics, and some of its potential contributions to understanding behavior in organizations. First I define what makes economic analysis "behavioral," and then turn to two sorts of ideas about systematic departures from the conventional rationality assumptions in economics-experimental studies of game-playing behavior, and unorthodox assumptions about incentives and labor economics. (The game theory studies are a small part of a broad research program that will result. I think, in a very different sort of theory which is more descriptive than that of current theorizing.) The two strands are then loosely tied together in an alternative account of why LBO (leveraged buyout) restructuring of firms in the 1980s appears to have worked.
Additional Information
© 1998 ILR Press. Support from the Russell Sage Foundation during my visit there in 1991-1992, and from NSF grant 90-23531, is very gratefully acknowledged. Comments from the editors, from many conference participants, and from long talks with Chip Heath, Marc Knez, Martin Weber, and Daniel Kahneman (and other accomplices named in the paper), were very helpful.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 22390
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110218-150112514
- Russell Sage Foundation
- 90-23531
- NSF
- Created
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2011-03-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Frank W. Pierce Memorial Lectureship and Conference Series
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 10