Published December 1987
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence
- Creators
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Camerer, Colin F.
Chicago
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Abstract
Microeconomic theory typically concerns exchange between individuals or firms in a market setting. To make predictions precise, individuals are usually assumed to use the laws of probability in structuring and revising beliefs about uncertainties. Recent evidence, mostly gathered by psychologists, suggests probability theories might be inadequate descriptive models of individual choice. (See the books edited by Daniel Kahneman et al., 1982a, and by Hal Arkes and Kenneth Hammond, 1986.)
Additional Information
© 1987 American Economic Association. I thank Mike Chemew, Marc Knez, Peter Knez, and Lisabeth Miller for research assistance. Helpful comments have been received from three anonymous referees, Greg Fischer, Len Green, David Grether, Dan Kahneman, John Kagel, Peter Knez, George Loewenstein, Charles Plott, Paul Slovic, Shyam Sunder, Richard Thaler, Keith Weigelt, and especially Howard Kunreuther. This research was funded by the Wharton Risk and Decision Processes Center, the Alfred Sloan Foundation grant no. 8551, and the National Science Foundation grant no. SES-8510758.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 22188
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110215-091225602
- Wharton Risk and Decision Processes Center
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- 8551
- NSF
- SES-8510758
- Created
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2011-03-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field