Published 1988
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols
- Creators
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Camerer, Colin
Abstract
Gift-giving has often puzzled economists, especially because efficient gifts-like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for-seem crass or inappropriate. It is shown in a formal game-theoretic model that gifts serve as "signals" of a person's intentions about future investment in a relationship, and inefficient gifts can be better signals. Other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced, and some stylized facts about gift-giving practices are described (many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts).
Additional Information
© 1988 by The University of Chicago. Thanks to Andrew Daughety, Mary Douglas, Gerry Faulhaber, Jack Hirschleifer, Howard Kunreuther, George Loewenstein, Ari Vepsalainen, Keith Weigelt, and the editors and referees of this supplement for encouragement and comments.Attached Files
Published - 2780246_1_.pdf
Files
2780246_1_.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 22177
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110214-154358164
- Created
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2011-03-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field