Published March 1995
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
- Creators
- Camerer, Colin F.
- Thaler, Richard H.
Abstract
Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to "rationalize" or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm. This column will resume, after a long rest, the investigation of such anomalies.
Additional Information
© 1995 American Economic Association. We would like to thank Ernst Fehr, John Kagel, Al Roth, Vernon Smith, Richard Zeckhauser and, as always, the editors for helpful comments. None should be blamed if we have been unfair or rude.Attached Files
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- Eprint ID
- 22127
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-085157548
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