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Published December 1995 | Published
Journal Article Open

Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining

Abstract

When court trials (or arbitration) are the mechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses, the costs and risks associated with third-party intervention should motivate settlement (Henry Farber and Harry Katz, 1979). However, empirical evidence suggests that impasses and inefficient settlements are common in the legal system and in contract negotiations. For example, one study of asbestos suits found that only 37 cents of every dollar spent by both sides end up in the plaintiffs' hands (James Kakalik et al., 1983).

Additional Information

© 1995 American Economic Association. We are grateful for the comments of Jodi Gillis, Henry Hu, Douglas Laycock, Stewart Schwab, Charles Silver, Ruth Silverman, and the participants in the John M. Olin Conference on Dispute Settlement; we also thank Arlene Simon and Saul Straussman for research assistance. Loewenstein acknowledges the support of the Russell Sage Foundation; Issacharoff acknowledges the support of the Dean's Roundtable of the University of Texas School of Law and the Shell Oil Foundation; Camerer acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (grant no. SES-9023531)

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