Published April 2003
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately
- Creators
- Camerer, Colin F.
Abstract
Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.
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© 2003 Cambridge University Press.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 22110
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110210-111548195
- Created
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2011-03-10Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field