Published May 2010
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Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching
- Creators
-
Echenique, Federico
Abstract
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms.
Additional Information
I thank Vince Crawford, Flip Klijn, Scott Kominers, and Michael Ostrovsky for very useful comments. I am also very grateful to three anonymous referees for their thoughtful questions and suggestions.Attached Files
Published - sswp1322.pdf
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sswp1322.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 20348
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-093110872
- Created
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2010-10-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1322