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Published August 2003 | public
Journal Article

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

Abstract

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

Additional Information

© 2003 Springer-Verlag. Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002. I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 20, 2023