Published January 2010
| public
Journal Article
Bayesian consistent belief selection
- Creators
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Chambers, Christopher P.
- Hayashi, Takashi
Abstract
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.
Additional Information
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. Received 14 January 2008; final version received 2 September 2008; accepted 15 July 2009. Available online 29 July 2009. The authors would like to thank Kim Border, Federico Echenique, Larry Epstein, Bart Lipman, Max Stinchcombe, John Quiggin, and Bill Zame for helpful discussions and comments. The associate editor and two anonymous referees also provided comments which were very helpful. All errors are our own.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 17747
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20100316-092521312
- Created
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2010-03-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field