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Published December 2009 | Published
Journal Article Open

Cooperative Control and Potential Games

Abstract

We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of agent capabilities and group based decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium.

Additional Information

© Copyright 2009 IEEE. Manuscript received September 16, 2008; revised January 28, 2009. First published April 14, 2009; current version published November 18, 2009. This work was supported in part by the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, by the Army Research Office under Grant W911NF04316, by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under Grant FA9550-08-1-0375, and by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECS-0501394 and Grant ECCS-0547692. This paper was recommended by Associate Editor T. Vasilakos.

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August 19, 2023
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