Published February 2007
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Journal Article
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Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes
Abstract
We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders,nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders, and that non-median outcomes can result via any of these processes. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition.
Additional Information
© 2007 M.O. Jackson, L. Mathevet and K. Mattes. MS submitted 19 September 2006; final version received 29 January 2007. We thank Jon Eguia and Heidi Kamp for their valuable input and insights at early stages of the project, as well as David Austen-Smith, Nolan McCarty and two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the National Science Foundation under grant SES-0316493.Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 9300
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:JACqjps07
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2007-12-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field