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Published December 2018 | public
Journal Article

Attack-Resilient H_2, H_∞, and ℓ_1 State Estimator

Abstract

This paper considers the secure state estimation problem for noisy systems in the presence of sparse sensor integrity attacks. We show a fundamental limitation: that is, 2ρ-detectability is necessary for achieving bounded estimation errors, where ρ is the number of attacks. This condition is weaker than the 2ρ-observability condition typically assumed in the literature. Conversely, we propose a real-time state estimator that achieves the fundamental limitation. The proposed state estimator is inspired by robust control and FDI: that is, it consists of local Luenberger estimators, local residual detectors, and a global fusion process. We show its performance guarantees for H_2, H_∞, and ℓ_1 systems. Finally, numerical examples show that it has relatively low estimation errors among existing algorithms and average computation time for systems with a sufficiently small number of compromised sensors.

Additional Information

© 2018 IEEE. Manuscript received January 6, 2018; accepted March 8, 2018. Date of publication March 26, 2018; date of current version December 3, 2018. This research is supported by National Science Foundation (NSF), Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1 under Grant no. M4011866. The authors would like to thank Professor John Doyle and Professor Richard Murray for insightful discussions.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 18, 2023