Consistent representative democracy
- Creators
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Chambers, Christopher P.
Abstract
We study axioms which define "representative democracy" in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules "partial priority rules." A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can "veto" certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.
Additional Information
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. Received 12 July 2006; Available online 6 July 2007. I would like to thank John Duggan, Larry Epstein, Biung-Ghi Ju, Roger Lagunoff, Leonardo Martinez, Francesco Squintani, and William Thomson for useful conversations. The associate editor and two anonymous referees also provided valuable comments. All errors are my own. Formerly SSWP 1217.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83810
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-134829793
- Created
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2017-12-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field