Published September 2007
| public
Journal Article
Citizen candidates under uncertainty
- Creators
- Eguia, Jon X.
Abstract
In this paper I add uncertainty about the total vote count to a "citizen candidate" model of representative democracy. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.
Additional Information
© Springer-Verlag 2006. Received: 17 January 2006 / Accepted: 6 October 2006 / Published online: 9 November 2006. This work has benefited from valuable comments by Paul Healy, Morgan Kousser, Alejandro Saporiti, Al Slivinski, participants in a seminar in Princeton, and especially by Matt Jackson and Tom Palfrey. Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 1233.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83807
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-133303625
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2017-12-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field