Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
- Creators
- Lee, Sangmok
Abstract
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent of overall stable matchings. In one-to-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mechanism does not exceed the gap between utilities from the best and worst stable partners. Thus, most agents in a large market would not have significant incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms. The incentive compatibility extends to many-to-one matching when agents employ truncation strategies and capacity manipulations in a Gale—Shapley mechanism.
Additional Information
© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited. Advance access publication 14 September 2016. This article is part of my dissertation at Caltech. I am especially grateful to Federico Echenique, Matt Shum, and Leeat Yariv for encouragement and guidance, and Jan Tilly for excellent research assistance. I thank the editor, Philipp Kircher, and three anonymous referees for thoughtful and detailed comments. For very helpful comments, I also thank Hyoung-Jun Ahn, Itai Ashlagi, Luke Boosey, Kim Border, Andrea Bui, Chris Chambers, Guilherme Freitas, Cary Frydman, Tadashi Hashimoto, John Hatfield, Miriam Kim, Fuhito Kojima, Sera Linardi, George Mailath, Ruth Mendel, Juan Pereyra, Andy Postlewaite, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Tom Ruchti, Bob Sherman, Erik Snowberg, Tayfun Sönmez, and Bumin Yenmez, as well as seminar participants in various places. Supplementary data are available at Review of Economic Studies online. Formerly SSWP 1350.Attached Files
Supplemental Material - rdw041_Supp.zip
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83762
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-151716767
- Created
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2017-12-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field