Published 1982
| public
Book Section - Chapter
On the properties of stable decision procedures
- Creators
- Ferejohn, John A.
- Grether, David M.
Abstract
Nonunanimous voting processes seldom possess voting equilibria if the number of alternatives is large. The discovery of this fact has led to an intense search for new "solution concepts" for voting games that are capable of predicting outcomes in cases in which equilibria fail to exist. The reader is referred to papers by Kramer (1977), Fiorina and Shepsle (this volume), and Riker (this volume) for examples and further discussion.
Additional Information
© Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing 1982. Formerly SSWP 210.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83642
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_8
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068
- Created
-
2017-12-21Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Studies in Public Choice
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 4