Electing Legislatures
- Creators
- Austen-Smith, David
- Other:
- Schofield, Norman
Abstract
Policy outcomes in representative democracies arise out of legislative decision-making, and out of legislatures that consist of more than one elected official. The preferences of policy-oriented voters over possible representatives, therefore, will be induced both by their preferences over policy outcomes and the institutional structure of legislative decision-making. This observation is, I believe, fundamental to developing models, and to an understanding of the election of legislatures. Models of elected legislatures that assume, at the outset, individuals who vote on the basis of the policy positions of the available candidates, without regard to the legislative implications of their vote, misspecify both individual payoffs and the choice set.
Additional Information
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1996. Formerly SSWP 644.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83610
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-145454421
- Created
-
2017-12-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Recent Economic Thought Series
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 50