Published July 1995
| public
Journal Article
Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Creators
- McKelvey, Richard D.
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Palfrey, Thomas R.
Abstract
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so as well. We define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimation.
Additional Information
© 1995 Academic Press. Received March 18, 1994. We acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. We thank Barry O'Neill, Richard Boebel, Jack Ochs, and Amnon Rapoport for sharing their data. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar presentations, suggestions by a referee, and the research assistance of Yan Chen and Eugene Grayver. Formerly SSWP 883.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83557
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-164515991
- SBR-9223701
- NSF
- JPL-Caltech supercomputer project
- Created
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2017-11-29Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field