Published February 1979
| public
Journal Article
The role of money in supporting the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibrium in consumption-loan type models
- Creators
- Cass, David
- Okuno, Masahiro
- Zilcha, Itzhak
Chicago
Abstract
Perhaps the single most enduring theme in economics is that of the social desirability of the competitive mechanism. In its modern form, this theme occurs as the two basic theorems of welfare economics (see, in particular, Arrow). Our central concern in this paper is with the validity of the first of these two theorems—that every competitive equilibrium yields a Pareto optimal allocation—in idealized yet plausible models of intertemporal allocation in a market economy.
Additional Information
Received December 10, 1978. This paper was prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Conference on Models of Monetary Economies, held December 7–8, 1978. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 242.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83375
- DOI
- 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90062-0
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-163025356
- NSF
- Created
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2017-11-21Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field