Published February 1982
| public
Journal Article
A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide
- Creators
- Reinganum, Jennifer F.
Abstract
It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate, in the sense that it depends on time only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.
Additional Information
© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1982. Communicated by G. Leitmann. The helpful comments of Professors Y. C. Ho, G. Leitmann, H. Y. Wan, Jr., and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 333.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83326
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-170436020
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2017-11-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2023-04-27Created from EPrint's last_modified field