Published January 1984
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Creators
- Green, Edward J.
- Porter, Robert H.
Abstract
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
Additional Information
© 1984 The Econometric Society. We have accepted the generous help of many colleagues in the course of this research. We would particularly like to thank C. Berry, T. Bresnahan, J. Friedman, J. Mirrlees, S. Salop, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Willig. Robert Porter's research received support from a Sloan Foundation grant to the University of Minnesota Economics Department. Formerly SSWP 367.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83298
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-140712553
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Created
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2017-11-17Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field