Published February 1985
| public
Journal Article
Oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource: The importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games
- Creators
- Reinganum, Jennifer F.
- Stokey, Nancy L.
Abstract
The theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization - for example, questions about resource extraction, advertising, research and development, investment in new capacity; and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved. However, an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game. The issue is the appropriate formulation of the players' strategy spaces.
Additional Information
© 1985 Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania. Manuscript received October, 1983; revised March, 1984. This work was supported by an IBM Research Professorship and by the Center for Advanced Study in Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University. Formerly SSWP 377.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83273
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-164654448
- IBM
- Northwestern University Center for Advanced Study in Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences
- Created
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2017-11-17Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field