Published 1987
| public
Journal Article
Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Creators
- Strnad, Jeff
Abstract
This paper characterizes neutral social functions that are fully implementable. A neutral social function must be monotonic and simple to be fully implementable under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the strong Nash equilibrium concept. If a neutral social function is monotonic and simple, then the social function is fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite alternative sets a neutral social function will be fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and only if it is monotonic, simple and dictatorial.
Additional Information
© 1987 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland). Accepted October 1986. This article is derived from a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, Strnad (1982). I have profited greatly from the suggestions and guidance of Donald Brown in this work. Richard McKelvey, the referee of this journal and participants at the 1984 Public Choice Society Annual Meeting in Phoenix and at the California Institute of Technology Economic Theory Workshop made valuable comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility. Substantial financial support for this work has been provided by Summer Research Grants for 1981 and 1982 from the University of Southern California Law Center. Formerly SSWP 500.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83206
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-151808798
- University of Southern California Law Center
- Created
-
2017-11-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field