Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model
- Creators
- McKelvey, Richard D.
- Ordeshook, Peter C.
Abstract
We develop a game-theoretic model of two-candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants. The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike) observe contemporaneous poll data broken-down by various subgroups of the population. The results of the paper give conditions on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) extracts all information.
Additional Information
© 1987 Elsevier. Communicated by K.H. Kim. Received 28 April 1986. We acknowledge support from NSF grant #SES 8208184. Formerly SSWP 529.Additional details
- Alternative title
- Elections with limited information: A multi-dimensional model
- Eprint ID
- 83194
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-135844777
- SES-8208184
- NSF
- Created
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2017-11-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field