Published June 1992
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Bidding rings
- Creators
- McAfee, R. Preston
- McMillan, John
Abstract
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.
Additional Information
© 1992 American Economic Association. We thank Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, Charles Holt, Ignatius Horstmann, Chantale LaCasse, Robert Marshall, Joel Sobel, and three referees for comments. McAfee's research was begun at the U.S. Department of Justice. McMillan thanks the National Science Foundation for research support under grant no. SES-8721124. Formerly SSWP 726.Attached Files
Published - sswp726_-_published.pdf
Files
sswp726_-_published.pdf
Files
(825.0 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:3f137f4fa197488996cb460bf833f306
|
825.0 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83096
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-163526509
- SES-8721124
- NSF
- Created
-
2017-11-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field