Published May 2004
| public
Journal Article
Virtual Repeated Implementation
- Creators
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Chambers, Christopher P.
Abstract
We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.
Additional Information
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. Received 11 November 2003, Accepted 19 November 2003, Available online 18 February 2004. I would like to thank Matthew Jackson and John Ledyard for their comments and suggestions. All errors are my own. Formerly SSWP 1179.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82958
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-154509663
- Created
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2017-11-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field