Published February 2006
| public
Journal Article
Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
- Creators
- Chambers, Christopher P.
- Hayashi, Takashi
Abstract
Following Mongin [J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 331], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.
Additional Information
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Received 5 November 2003; Available online 26 February 2005. We would like to thank Philippe Mongin and JohnWeymark for many very helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Larry Epstein and William Thomson, for many helpful discussions. An anonymous referee and the associate editor also provided very useful comments. All errors are our own. Formerly SSWP 1184.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82952
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.003
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-152725193
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2017-11-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field